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 ABSTRACT 
 
Management Earnings Forecast Decisions in a Regulated  
Regime: Evidence from China 
 
 
by 
 
 
YANG Jingyu 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Since 2000, China has required publicly listed firms to issue management earnings 
forecasts when they expect extreme changes in earnings or are likely to become 
loss-making. This study examines managers’ forecast decisions under this unique 
regulatory environment. I find an increase over time in the proportion of firms 
issuing voluntary earnings forecasts when they do not expect extreme changes in 
their earnings or losses. I also find an improvement in the quality—in terms of the 
precision, accuracy and bias—of both mandatory and voluntary forecasts over time. 
Further detailed analysis shows that the introduction of the regulation on 
management earnings forecasts is one of the underlying forces driving firms’ 
decisions to provide voluntary earnings forecasts. Specifically, I find that a firm is 
more likely to issue a voluntary forecast if the firm was required by regulation to 
issue an earnings forecast in the previous year. Peer pressure also explains firms’ 
decisions to issue voluntary forecasts. I then investigate the reasons underlying the 
improvement in the quality of management earnings forecasts. I find that learning 
effects and peer pressure are the driving forces behind the improvement. Specifically, 
I find that the forecasts issued by more experienced firms are more specific, accurate 
and conservative. Furthermore, the quality of a firm’s forecast is positively related to 
the quality of its peer firms. Overall, my results show that requiring some listed firms 
to issue management earnings forecasts in China might have built up a momentum 
that has promoted the issuance of voluntary forecasts and improved the quality of 
forecasts over time. 
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Management Earnings Forecast Decisions in a Regulated  
 
Regime: Evidence from China 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Since 2000, China has required publicly listed firms to issue management earnings 
forecasts when they expect extreme changes in earnings or are likely to become 
loss-making. Based on management earnings forecast data obtained for 2007-2013, I 
find that the quantity of management earnings forecasts in China has increased over 
these years, with the number of firms issuing forecasts increasing from 515 to 1,004. 
More importantly, I also find an increase over time in the proportion of firms issuing 
voluntary forecasts. Specifically, the proportion of voluntary forecasters increased 
from 12% in 2007 to 60% in 2013, which is higher than the corresponding proportion 
in countries where decisions about forecasts are voluntary (25% obtained from Hamn 
et al. 2014). Furthermore, the quality of the management earnings forecasts has also 
improved consistently and substantially over time. For example, I find that during 
this period the average forecast error level decreased by 99.6% while the average 
precision level increased by about 60%.  
 
My study examines the determinants of management forecast decisions in China’s 
unique regulatory environment. Specifically, I determine whether the selective 
mandatory forecast requirement outlined above leads to the issuing not only of 
mandatory earnings forecasts, but also of voluntary earnings forecasts. Furthermore, 
I also examine whether the selective mandatory forecast requirement induces peer 
and learning effects that result in an improvement in the quality of management 
earnings forecasts.   
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I expect that China’s selective mandatory forecasting requirement promotes the 
issuing of voluntary earnings forecasts, for two reasons. First, recent theoretical 
studies on corporate disclosure policies suggest that firms display intertemporal 
stickiness in their disclosure behavior (Einhorn and Ziv, 2008). Specifically, firms 
tend to refrain from making voluntary disclosures if they have not made them in the 
past. However, the selective mandatory forecast requirement means that publicly 
listed firms in China are mandated to issue forecasts from time to time, which tends 
to break the stickiness in non-disclosure. As Einhorn and Ziv (2008) argue, once the 
firm has made a disclosure, then that firm will face a higher cost of non-disclosure 
and/or a lower cost of disclosure. As a result, I expect that firms will be more likely 
to issue a voluntary forecast if they have previously been mandated to issue a 
forecast.   
 
Second, the existence of the selective mandatory forecast requirement leads to a 
significant number of firms being mandated to issue forecasts from time to time. 
Recent studies of corporate disclosure suggest that firms may compete to disclose 
more firm information to outsiders to signal their quality to investors (Hidalgo 
Cabrillana, 2013) or to reduce the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Graham et al., 2005; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001). The presence of a large number of forecasters potentially 
gives rise to peer effects in which firms are pressured to issue voluntary forecasts to 
compete with peer firms. Such peer effects may be stronger when the selective 
mandatory forecast requirement also promotes the issuing of voluntary forecasts, 
further increasing the number of forecasters in an industry. 
 
I obtain evidence that is consistent with the above predictions. Specifically, I find 
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that firms are more likely to issue a voluntary forecast if they were required to issue 
an earnings forecast in the previous year. More importantly, I find a significant 
positive association between the proportion of peer firms issuing both mandatory and 
voluntary forecasts and the likelihood of a firm issuing a voluntary forecast.   
 
Regarding the determinants of forecast quality, I also expect that peer effects will 
have driven the improvement in forecast quality evident in China. To the extent that 
firms have to compete not only in providing forecasts but also in producing 
good-quality forecasts (Hidalgo Cabrillana, 2013), I expect to find a positive 
relationship between a firm’s forecasting quality and the average forecasting quality 
of peer firms in the same industry. I also expect that the selective mandatory forecast 
requirement will give rise to learning effects, because the selective mandatory 
forecast requirement mandates firms to issue earnings forecasts from time to time. 
The learning effect will be stronger if the selective mandatory forecast requirement 
also encourages firms to issue voluntary forecasts, further increasing the forecasting 
experience accumulated by a firm. To the extent that an effective learning effect 
exists (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Huber, 1991), I expect the forecasts made by firms 
with a longer forecasting experience to be more precise, more accurate and less 
biased.    
 
I also obtain evidence that is consistent with the hypotheses above; that is, firms tend 
to issue earnings forecasts that are more precise, accurate and conservative if they 
have more forecasting experience. Furthermore, the forecasting quality of a firm is 
positively correlated with that of its peers. Overall, my results suggest that China’s 
selective mandatory forecast requirement may have given rise to an information 
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environment that encourages firms to issue voluntary forecasts and promotes an 
improvement in forecast quality over time. 
 
My study makes several contributions to the literature on management earnings 
forecasts. First, it contributes to the literature by offering evidence on management 
earnings forecast decisions in a regulated environment that has not yet been 
investigated by previous research. Previous studies examined management earnings 
forecast decisions in which disclosure is either purely voluntary (e.g. Baginski et al. 
2002; Ajinkya et al. 2005) or effectively mandated (e.g. Kato et al. 2009; Jelic et al. 
1998). China’s selective mandatory forecast requirement integrates elements of both 
mandatory and voluntary regimes, as firms are required to issue forecasts under 
certain conditions while remaining free to issue forecasts voluntarily under other 
conditions. This regulatory regime applies not only to mainland China but also to 
other markets such as that of Taiwan. China has the largest emerging market that has 
gradually been opened up to foreign investors. Research on this topic will thus be of 
great interest to investors.  
 
Second, previous studies identify several factors that may influence management 
forecast decisions, such as legal environment, disclosure regulations, the political 
economy, corporate governance, product market competition and customer 
relationships (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Chin et al., 2006; 
Heflin et al., 2012; Hidalgo Cabrillana, 2013; Johnson et al., 2001; Li, 2010; 
Radhakrishnan et al., 2012). My study highlights two determinants that are new to 
the literature, namely peer effects and learning effects, and demonstrates how these 
influence management forecast decisions. My results enhance our understanding of 
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the determinants of management forecast decisions.    
 
Third, in contrast to previous research based on the management earnings forecasts 
made by firms in developed countries such as the U.S. (e.g. Karamanou and Vafeas 
2005; Ajinkya et al. 2005), Canada (Baginski et al., 2002) and Japan (Kato et al., 
2009), my research is conducted in an emerging market. It is well known that 
emerging markets tend to have a more primitive investor protection framework and a 
weaker information environment than mature markets (La Porta et al., 2000). How to 
regulate corporate disclosure policies in such markets has been intensely debated. 
The results of my study should have important policy implications for China and 
other emerging markets.  
 
My study also contributes to the literature on financial reporting regulations. First, 
my study shows that China’s selective mandatory forecast requirement can serve as a 
policy intervention that changes the costs of non-disclosure/disclosure faced by 
publicly listed firms and promotes voluntary disclosure. Second, in a recent review 
of the literature on financial reporting regulations, Leuz and Wysocki (2015) suggest 
that “we generally lack evidence on market-wide effects and externalities from 
regulation, yet such evidence is obviously central to the economic justification of 
regulation.” My study examines the peer effects and learning effects that have 
emerged since the introduction of the selective mandatory disclosure requirement in 
China and demonstrates how they influence both the quantity and the quality of 
management forecasts. In doing so, my study offers evidence on how this 
requirement can generate market-wide spillover effects and long-term effects in a 
financial system. Thus, my study can further enhance the understanding of financial 
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reporting regulations.   
 
My study is also related to a working paper by Huang et al. (2014), which also 
examines how China’s selective mandatory forecast requirement influences the 
issuing and quality of voluntary disclosures. However, my study differs in three 
respects. First, I use a different sample period. While Huang et al. (2014) focus on 
2004-2011, my study examines management earnings forecasts from 2007 to 2013. 
Second, Huang et al. (2014) only examine how the issuing of a mandatory forecast in 
the previous year influences the probability of a firm issuing a voluntary forecast in 
the current year. I examine an additional determinant, namely the peer effect. Indeed, 
my evidence shows that the determinants examined in my study have a stronger 
explanatory power regarding the decision to make a voluntary disclosure in China. 
Third, Huang et al. (2014) measure forecast quality according to precision and 
timeliness, whereas I examine it in terms of precision, error and bias. I focus on peer 
effects and learning effects as the determinants of forecast quality, rather than the 
forecasting experience in the previous year, as Huang et al. (2014) study.     
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the 
institutional setting in China, reviews previous papers and develops testable 
predictions. Chapter 3 describes the sample and the data. Chapter 4 examines the 
forces underlying voluntary disclosure and Chapter 5 discusses drivers of 
improvements in forecast quality. Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
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Chapter 2. Research Background 
2.1. Regulation of Management Earnings Forecasts in China. 
Unlike the U.S. stock market, where management earnings forecasts are voluntary, 
management earnings forecasts on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
have been semi-mandatory since the end of 2000. Initially, only publicly listed 
firms that anticipated making a loss were required to issue management earnings 
forecasts. The conditions under which firms are required to issue forecasts have 
since been continuously extended and modified, with firms being required to issue 
forecasts under a broader range of conditions. In 2001, the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges required listed firms to issue management earnings forecasts not 
only if they expected to make a loss, but also if they expected an increase or 
decrease in earnings of more than 50%. In 2006, firms were further required to 
issue forecasts if they expected to make a profit in a particular year after making a 
loss in the previous year. This essentially completed the management earnings 
forecast regulations in China. Table 1 gives a brief summary of the development of 
the management earnings forecast regulations of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange since 2000. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
According to the 2006 regulations, all earnings forecasts are classified by issuers 
into nine types: slight earnings increase (positive change but less than 50%), slight 
earnings decrease (negative change but less than 50%), uncertain, profit making 
again (making a profit), loss making again (making a loss), large earnings increase 
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(positive change and more than 50%), large earnings decrease (negative change 
and more than 50%), turning loss into profit (making a profit) and loss for the first 
time (making a loss). Of these categories, loss making again, large earnings 
increase, large earnings decrease, turning loss into profit and loss for the first time 
represent the circumstances under which firms have been required to issue 
management earnings forecasts since 2007. 
 
2.2. Literature Review. 
In this section, I review the relevant literature on management earnings forecast 
decisions and explain how my study contributes to the literature. My study is 
directly related to the literature on the determinants of management earnings 
forecasts. Previous studies suggest that many factors, such as the legal environment, 
disclosure regulations, board composition, ownership structure, managerial 
incentives and market competition, affect the management earnings forecast 
decisions of firms. Of these factors, research on the effects of disclosure 
regulations on management earnings forecast decisions is particularly relevant to 
my study. Using a sample of high-tech firms, Johnson et al. (2001) study the effects 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), enacted in 1995 by the 
U.S. Congress to reduce frivolous securities class actions related to the voluntary 
disclosure of forward-looking information. They find that the PSLRA reduces the 
litigation risk faced by firms and thereby increases the incentive of managers to 
release forward-looking information. They also show that the PSLRA does not 
have a negative effect on the quality of forward-looking information. Subsequently, 
in 2000, the SEC passed the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which prohibits 
firms from disclosing information to selected analysts without simultaneously 
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providing the same earnings guidance to the public. Several studies, including 
those of Heflin et al. (2003), Bailey et al. (2003) and Ajinkya et al. (2005), find that 
Reg FD increases voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Kothari et al. (2009) find that 
Reg FD constrains managers’ incentives to withhold bad news. However, the study 
conducted by Wang (2007) suggests that disclosure decisions taken after the 
implementation of Reg FD depend on firm’ characteristics. Firms reduce their 
earnings guidance if they have lower information asymmetry and higher propriety 
information costs. Heflin et al. (2012) investigate the effect of Reg FD on the 
properties of management earnings forecasts. They find that Reg FD reduces 
optimistic bias in management earnings forecasts and thereby increases forecast 
accuracy.  
 
Despite the existence of a large body of literature on the effects of various 
disclosure regulations on management earnings forecast decisions, my study 
extends the literature in two important ways. First, the existing studies focus on 
management earnings forecast decisions in either purely voluntary or purely 
mandatory regimes. Few studies examine how China’s unique regulations (i.e. the 
selective mandatory disclosure requirement) can influence both the quantity and 
the quality of management earnings forecast decisions. Many studies that examine 
the issuing of management earnings forecasts in voluntary regimes find that this is 
affected by managers’ incentives (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Baginski et al., 2002; 
Brockman et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2013; Frankel et al., 1995; Koch, 2002; Li et 
al., 2012; Matsumoto, 2002; Noe, 1999; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Ruland et al., 
1990). For example, Baginski et al. (2002) find that managers in Canada are more 
likely to issue forecasts than managers in the U.S., due to lower litigation risks. 
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Other studies show that managerial incentives influence the quality of voluntary 
earnings forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) finds that managers are likely to release 
downward-biased forecasts to avoid negative earnings surprises when actual 
earnings are disclosed. Previous studies also find that ownership structure and 
board composition influence the occurrence of voluntary disclosures and their 
quality. Ajinkya et al. (2005), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and El-Gazzar (1998) 
show that institutional ownership is associated with a greater likelihood of earnings 
forecasts. Furthermore, the findings of Ajinkya et al. (2005) suggest that an 
increase in the proportion of outside directors leads to more earnings forecasts. 
They also find that a higher proportion of outside directors and greater institutional 
ownership are associated with more-specific, more-accurate and less-optimistically 
biased forecasts.  
 
Other streams of research look at management earnings forecasts in purely 
mandatory regimes. For example, Kato et al. (2009) study management earnings 
forecasts in Japan, where these forecasts are effectively mandated. Similar to the 
quality of management earnings forecasts in voluntary environments, their study 
indicates that forecast optimism is affected by the incentives of managers and by 
the ownership structure. Jelic et al. (1998) study the accuracy of earnings forecasts 
in IPO prospectuses in Malaysia, where firms are required to include earnings 
forecasts in their prospectuses. However, they do not find evidence that corporate 
governance is associated with forecast accuracy. Instead, they find that firm 
operating age is inversely related to forecast error.  
 
The majority of the existing studies focus on management earnings forecasts in 
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either voluntary or mandatory regulated regimes. In this paper, I study management 
earnings forecast decisions and the quality of the forecasts under a unique 
regulation that integrates elements of both the mandatory and voluntary regimes. I 
specifically examine the interaction between the voluntary and the mandatory 
elements of the regulation—how a firm’s decision to make a voluntary disclosure is 
related to the mandatory forecasting experience/requirements of that firm and of its 
peers.     
 
Second, previous studies tend to focus on how the regulations themselves can 
affect the disclosure incentives of forecasting firms. My study focuses on some of 
the market-wide and intertemporal effects of the regulations (i.e. peer and learning 
effects) that can affect forecast decisions. Learning effects have been shown to be 
an important factor in influencing the earnings forecasts of analysts (Clement and 
Tse, 2003; Hilary and Shen, 2013; Mikhail et al., 2003). However, there is little 
evidence on whether and how the quality of management earnings forecasts is 
related to the forecasting experience of firms. Several recent studies examine the 
spillover effects of accounting restatements. For example, Xu et al. (2006) and 
Gleason et al. (2008) find that restatement results in an increase in the cost of 
capital not only for the restating firm, but also for its competitors. Sadka (2006) 
and Beatty et al. (2013) find that misreporting by firms can have spillover effects 
on real investment. However, no previous study examines whether there are peer 
effects on these corporate disclosure decisions. I extend the literature by examining 
whether and how management earnings forecast decisions in China are influenced 
by peer effects.  
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2.3. Hypotheses Development. 
According to Einhorn and Ziv (2008), a long history of no disclosure will build a 
reputation of being uninformed, which alleviates the negative market reaction to 
the withholding of information in the current period and facilitates the continued 
suppression of information in the future. Once such a reputation is built, it is 
difficult to break the stickiness of not providing disclosures, because the high 
indirect disclosure costs 1  generated by such stickiness inhibit firms from 
disclosing information. Thus, if a firm has a long history of withholding 
information, it is difficult to motivate that firm to make a voluntary disclosure. 
However, the selective mandatory forecast requirement acts as an intervention that 
breaks such stickiness because it mandates firms to issue a forecast under certain 
conditions. Once a firm has been mandated to issue a forecast, it reveals to the 
public that the firm was in possession of private information and is capable of 
issuing a forecast. This will weaken the firm’s reputation for being uninformative 
and will increase its costs of non-disclosure. Furthermore, the previous mandatory 
forecast will already have revealed some information to market participants such as 
competitors, labor unions, regulators and tax authorities. This will lower the 
proprietary costs of disclosure faced by firms if they choose to issue a forecast in 
the future. In addition, there are also direct costs involved in preparing 
management earnings forecasts. Issuing a forecast involves information collection 
and estimation, which is often difficult and costly, especially given the 
forward-looking nature of the forecasts (Coates and Srinivasan, 2014). As the 
establishment of data collection and forecasting technology often entails a fixed 
cost, the existence of previous forecasting experience will lower the direct costs 
                                                             
1 The indirect disclosure costs include (a) future incremental disclosure costs; (b) reduced leeway to withhold 
information in the future; (c) increased price volatility due to the dependence of future stock prices on uncertain 
information.  
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involved in issuing a subsequent forecast.   
 
Given that a firm will gain benefits from issuing a voluntary forecast, the increase 
in the cost of non-disclosure and the reduction in both the direct and the indirect 
costs of disclosure will increase the probability of the firm issuing a voluntary 
forecast if that firm was previously required to make a forecast according to the 
regulations. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1: A firm is more likely to participate in the disclosure of management earnings 
forecasts if it was required to issue a forecast in the past.  
 
China’s selective mandatory forecast requirement means that some firms are 
required to issue management earnings forecasts from time to time. Forecasters 
may become more attractive to investors than non-forecasters because investors 
have more information about the former. If peer effects exist, a firm is more likely 
to issue earnings forecasts voluntarily if more firms in its industry are required to 
issue such forecasts. Furthermore, the existence of a large number of forecasters in 
an industry will also lower the proprietary cost of disclosure faced by a firm 
because market participants can obtain information on that firm through the 
forecasts issued by its peer firms, even if the firm itself does not issue a forecast. 
The lower proprietary costs of disclosure will also increase the likelihood of a firm 
issuing a voluntary forecast. Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
H2a: A firm is more likely to issue a voluntary earnings forecast if more peer firms 
have issued mandatory management earnings forecasts  
 
Peer effects may emerge when a significant proportion of a firm’s peers issue 
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mandatory earnings forecasts. If H2a is true, the mandatory requirement will also 
give rise to a large number of voluntary forecasters. For the same reasons as given 
above for mandatory forecasters, I also expect the existence of a large number of 
voluntary forecasters in an industry to increase the probability of a firm issuing a 
voluntary forecast. My hypothesis is as follows: 
H2b: A firm is more likely to issue a voluntary earnings forecast if more of its peer 
firms have issued voluntary management earnings forecasts. 
 
Previous studies (Clement and Tse, 2003; Hilary and Shen, 2013; Mikhail et al., 
2003) show that the accuracy of analyst forecasts increases with analysts’ 
firm-specific forecasting experience because more-experienced analysts can 
incorporate more prior earnings information. Gilson et al. (2001) show that 
forecasts issued by specialist analysts are more accurate than those issued by 
non-specialists, which also suggests the benefit of experience. Gong et al. (2011) 
find that earnings forecast error is smaller for a firm with a longer forecasting 
experience. Although managers tend to possess inside information on their firms, 
the issuing of management earnings forecasts involves expertise, the ability to 
understand the operations of the firm and the ability to predict the state of the 
industry, market conditions and development. Thus, I expect that learning effects 
will also exist in management earnings forecasts. Hence:  
H3: Management earnings forecast quality increases with a firm’s forecasting 
experience. 
 
A major insight from corporate voluntary disclosure is that firms can obtain various 
benefits from providing accurate and good-quality corporate information, such as 
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increases in liquidity (e.g. Lang and Maffett 2011), lower capital costs (e.g. 
Botosan 1997) and a greater capacity to raise external capital (e.g. Shroff et al. 
2013). If investors tend to evaluate and choose firms on the basis of their disclosure 
quality, there will be a peer effect whereby firms must compete with or at least 
match their peers in terms of disclosure quality. Hidalgo Cabrillana (2013) suggests 
that industry competition increases the quality of financial accounting reports 
because in more-competitive environments, more firms are competing for funds 
and thus firms will react by offering high-quality financial reporting as a signal to 
the capital market. Thus, if more firms in an industry are offering higher-quality 
management earnings forecasts to attract funds, then all of the firms in that industry 
will come under greater pressure to increase the quality of their management 
earnings forecasts. This leads to my final hypothesis: 
H4: A firm is more likely to issue high-quality forecasts if the management 
earnings forecasts issued by its peers are of a high quality. 
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Chapter 3. Data and Sample 
3.1. Sample Selection. 
This study uses management earnings forecast data collected from the WIND 
database. Because major revisions to the management earnings forecast regulations 
were completed in 2006, I only use observations for 2007-2013. This gives 29,908 
observations in the initial sample. I exclude pre-announcements from the sample 
because these are made after the end of the accounting period, when managers 
already know what has happened during that period. Thus, the accuracy of 
pre-announcements will differ from that of earnings forecasts.  
 
Accounting and governance data are collected from the CSMAR and RESSET 
databases. To calculate firm operating performance, I require observations to 
contain time-series accounting and financial information for at least the previous 
two years. There must also be sufficient information on the corporate board to 
capture corporate governance characteristics. This gives 10,725 observations in my 
final sample. Panel A of Table 2 describes the screening process used to select the 
sample of management earnings forecasts used in my analysis.   
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
3.2 Descriptive Evidence of an Increase in Voluntary Management Earnings 
Forecast Participation. 
 
I classify all of the management earnings forecasts in the final sample into two 
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categories according to China’s management earnings forecast regulations. If a firm 
experiences change in profits of more than 50%, makes a loss, or changes from 
loss-making to profit-making, I classify its management earnings forecasts as 
mandatory (MANDATORY). Other forecasts are classified as voluntary 
(VOLUNTARY). Panel B of Table 2 presents the time-series distribution of my 
sample. As shown, the number of total management earnings forecasts increases 
over the sample period, from 1,076 in 2007 to 2,479 in 2013 (column 2). However, 
the increase in the number of voluntary earnings forecasts is more dramatic, 
increasing from 104 to 1,320 over the sample period (column 3). Column 4 clearly 
shows that the percentage of voluntary management earnings forecasts increased 
by 43% over the seven-year period. Panel C of Table 2 reports the distribution of 
voluntary forecasts and the total number of forecasters. As shown, the proportion of 
voluntary forecasting firms increased from 12% in 2007 to 60% in 2013, indicating 
an increased propensity for firms to issue earnings forecasts voluntarily.  
 
3.3. Descriptive Evidence of Improvement in Management Earnings Forecast 
Quality. 
The main measures of management earnings forecast quality are PRECISION, 
ERROR and BIAS (see the Appendix for definitions of variables). Panel D of Table 
2 reports the distribution of management earnings forecast precision. All of the 
forecasts are classified into four groups: point, range, open-ended and qualitative. 
The table shows that a large proportion of the forecasts are range forecasts (62%). 
Moreover, following Ajinkya et al. (2005), I assign four ordered values to all of the 
forecasts based on their level of precision (PRECISION). Because point forecasts 
are the most precise, PRECISION is set to 3. For range forecasts, open-ended 
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forecasts and qualitative forecasts, PRECISION takes the values of 2, 1 and 0, 
respectively. Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates the ascending trend of average forecast 
precision by fiscal year. It clearly shows an improvement in management earnings 
forecast quality when judged on the basis of precision, with the average value 
increasing from 1.12 to 1.79 over the sample period. Moreover, the average 
precision of voluntary management earnings forecasts is seen to be higher than that 
for mandatory earnings forecasts. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
To identify the trend in forecast accuracy, I follow previous papers (Ajinkya et al., 
2005; Gong et al., 2011; Gong et al., 2009; Hilary et al., 2014; Rogers and Stocken, 
2005) by only including point and range forecasts in the accuracy analysis. To 
measure forecast accuracy I use ERROR, which is the absolute value of the 
difference between forecasted and actual profit, scaled by the product of shares 
outstanding and price at the beginning of the fiscal year (Ajinkya et al., 2005). For 
range forecasts, I use the mid-point as a proxy for the expectations of managers. 
The smaller the value of ERROR, the more accurate the management earnings 
forecast. Panel B of Figure 1 shows the downward trend of average management 
earnings forecast error over the sample period, indicating an improvement in 
management earnings forecast accuracy, from 1.96 in 2007 to 0.05 in 2013. It also 
demonstrates that, on average, voluntary management earnings forecasts are more 
accurate. 
 
A third measure of forecast quality is BIAS, defined as the difference between 
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forecasted and actual profit, scaled by the product of shares outstanding and price 
at the beginning of the fiscal year (Ajinkya et al., 2005). Panel C of Figure 1 
displays the average bias. Although the average bias fluctuates over the period, 
there is a clear downward trend. Firms tend to downward-bias their earnings 
forecasts less in 2013 (0.07) than in 2007 (1.30). The figures also shows that 
voluntary management earnings forecasts become more conservative.  
 
Overall, the descriptive evidence in Figure 1 reveals a significant improvement in 
management earnings forecast quality.  
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Chapter 4. Voluntary Disclosure of Management Earnings Forecasts  
The previous chapter revealed increased participation in voluntary earnings 
forecasting. This section further examines the factors that drive the voluntary 
earnings forecast disclosure decisions of firms. 
 
4.1 Variables for Testing the Effect of the Selective Mandatory Forecast 
Requirement on Voluntary Earnings Forecast Decisions.  
I expect the selective mandatory forecast requirement to have a positive influence 
on the voluntary disclosure decisions of firms. That is, if a firm is required to issue 
management earnings forecasts this year, that firm is more likely to issue 
management earnings forecasts voluntarily next year. To test this, I define the 
issuing of mandatory management earnings forecasts as PRE_MANDATORY, 
which equals 1 if a firm has been required to issue management earnings forecasts 
in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.  
 
4.2. Variables for Testing Peer Effects on Voluntary Earnings Forecast 
Disclosure Decisions.  
To examine the relationship between a firm’s voluntary forecast disclosure decision 
and its peers that are mandated to issue management earnings forecasts, I use 
MANDATORY_PROP, which is the proportion of peer firms in the industry that 
were required to release management earnings forecasts in the previous year. A 
larger MANDATORY_PROP value indicates that more firms in the industry issued 
mandatory earnings forecasts in the previous year. I expect a positive association 
between MANDATORY_PROP and VOLUNTARY. 
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Similarly, to test whether more voluntary earnings forecasts from peer firms are 
influencing disclosure I use VOLUNTARY_PROP, which is the proportion of peer 
firms that have issued management earnings forecasts voluntarily in the previous 
year. I also expect the coefficient for VOLUNTARY_PROP to be positive. 
 
4.3. Empirical Design.  
To test my hypotheses, I estimate the following regression: 
VOLUNTARY = 𝛼0  + 𝛼1 PRE_MANDATORY + 𝛼2 MANDATORY_PROP + 
𝛼3VOLUNTARY_PROP + Control Variables                             (1)                                 
 
The control variables are VOLUNTARY_PRE, MANDATORY, HORIZON, NEWS, 
ROA, VOL, LST, SIZE, M/B, LEV, OUT, INST, DUALIT, METING, TOP, ANALYST, 
SOE, MINDEX and ACCRUAL (see the Appendix for definitions of variables). In 
the regression, I use a Probit model with standard errors clustered at both the firm 
and the year levels. I also control for year and industry fixed effects.               
 
The variables in model (1) are defined in the Appendix and are explained as 
follows. In the regression, I use firm-specific control variables2 that may affect 
disclosure decisions. First, I include VOLUNTARY_PRE because whether a firm 
voluntarily discloses earnings forecasts may affect the firm’s disclosure decision in 
the current period. Second, findings from Kasznik and Lev (1995) suggest that to 
prevent litigation, a firm is more likely to make a disclosure when its earnings are 
disappointing. I thus control for return on assets (ROA) and news (NEWS), which 
                                                             
2 For detailed definitions, please refer to the Appendix. 
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equal 1 if the profit in the current forecasting period is larger than or equal to that 
of the same forecasting period in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. I include 
earnings volatility (VOL) because this affects the ability of managers to generate 
forecasts (Waymire, 1985). In addition, I control for the number of years that a firm 
has been listed because disclosure behavior is likely to vary with public familiarity 
with a firm (Chen et al., 2008). Compared with newly listed firms, investors know 
more about firms that have been listed for a long time and may thus demand less 
information from this type of firm. Also, Cox (1985) and Eng and Mak (2003) find 
that larger firms are more likely to issue management earnings forecasts, and thus I 
control for firm size (SIZE). I also include firm growth (M/B) because the value of 
a firm’s growth hinges on its expected future cash flows and growing firms may 
have greater information asymmetry issues and agency costs (Gong et al., 2009). In 
this situation, growing firms are expected to disclose more information to the 
public. Eng and Mak (2003) find an inverse relationship between debt and 
disclosure; thus, I include leverage (LEV). Previous studies, such as those of 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Eng and Mak (2003), find that corporate governance is 
closely associated with voluntary disclosure. Thus, to control for corporate 
governance I include the proportion of outside directors (OUT), the proportion of 
shares held by institutions (INST), CEO duality (DUALIT), the number of board 
meetings (MEETING) and the percentage of shares held by the largest 10 
shareholders (TOP). I also control for analyst coverage (ANALYST) because firms 
with more analyst coverage are under greater pressure from analysts to provide 
earnings forecasts. Additionally, I control for state ownership (SOE) because 
Radhakrishnan et al. (2012) find that greater political involvement leads to a lower 
incidence of earnings forecasts, as bureaucrats have the incentive to suppress 
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information disclosure to hide their expropriation of firms. Moreover, I include a 
comprehensive index of provincial market development (MINDEX) to control for 
the market development in the province in which the firm is located, because 
previous research finds an the association between the behavior of a firm and the 
market development in the firm’s location (Firth et al., 2011). Finally, as Francis et 
al. (2008) find that the incidence of voluntary disclosure is positively associated 
with earnings quality, I include total accruals (ACCRUAL) as a proxy for earnings 
quality. 
 
4.4. Main Analysis.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics based on 28,909 observations. 
This includes firms that issued voluntary forecasts and those that issued neither 
voluntary nor mandatory forecasts. The mean value of VOLUNTARY is 0.13 and 
the mean value of MANDATORY_PRE is 0.30, showing that on average 13% of the 
firms in the sample issued voluntary forecasts in a given accounting period and 30% 
of the firms were mandated to release earnings forecasts in the previous year. As 
shown in the table, the mean values of MANDATORY_PROP and of 
VOLUNTARY_PROP are 0.39 and 0.18, respectively. This suggests that, on average, 
39% of the firms in an industry issued mandatory forecasts in the previous year 
while 18% issued voluntary forecasts. The pairwise correlations between voluntary 
disclosure and the key explanatory variables are reported in Panel B of Table 3. 
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that MANDATORY_PRE, 
MANDATORY_PROP and VOLUNTARY_PROP are positively correlated with 
VOLUNTARY. Finally, the correlations between the variables of interest and the 
other control variables are modest, implying that multi-collinearity may not be of 
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concern in generating inferences.  
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Table 4 reports univariate comparisons of the determinants of voluntary 
participation. Compared with firms that do not issue either mandatory or voluntary 
management earnings forecasts, firms that issue voluntary earnings forecasts have 
significantly higher mean PRE_MANDATORY, MANDATORY_PROP and 
VOLUNTARY_PROP values. This suggests that both selective disclosure 
requirement effects and peer effects are important determinants of voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
The Probit analysis of the determinants of firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions are 
presented in column 1 of Table 5. The coefficient for PRE_MANDATORY is 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, consistent with my 
expectation that if a firm was required to issue a management earnings forecast in 
the previous year, it is more likely to disclose management earnings forecasts 
voluntarily in the current period. This provides evidence that China’s management 
earnings forecast regulation may facilitate the issuing of earnings forecasts. As 
shown, the coefficients for both MANDATORY_PROP and VOLUNTARY_PROP 
are significantly positive at the conventional level, supporting a strong and positive 
relationship between the proportion of peer firms that had issued management 
earnings forecasts mandatorily or voluntarily and a firm’s voluntary disclosure 
decision. Moreover, the coefficient for VOLUNTARY_PROP is greater than that for 
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MANDATORY_PROP, indicating that voluntary forecasting peers have a greater 
influence on the voluntary disclosure of firms than mandatory forecasting peers.  
 
Turning to the control variables, I find significantly negative coefficients for VOL, 
LEV, ACCRUAL and SOE. The negative coefficient for VOL is consistent with the 
view that it is more difficult for a firm that has had volatile earnings in the past to 
predict its earnings, and thus it is less likely that the firm will issue an earnings 
forecast. The negative coefficients for LEV, ACCRUAL and SOE show that a firm is 
less likely to issue a forecast if it has more debt or more accruals or if it is a 
state-owned enterprise. In addition, I find the coefficient for VOLUNTARY_PRE to 
be positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that if a firm 
has issued earnings forecasts voluntarily in the previous year it is more likely to do 
so in the current period. The positive coefficient for ROA shows that firms with 
better profits are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts. The corporate 
governance factors, including INST, DUALITY and MEETING, are significant in 
explaining the occurrence of voluntary management earnings forecasts. The 
coefficient for INST is positive and influential, consistent with the finding of 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) that institutional ownership is associated with a greater 
likelihood of earnings forecasts. Finally, the coefficients for ANALYST and 
MINDEX are positive, implying that a firm tends to forecast voluntarily if it has 
more analysts following it or if it is located in a more developed province.   
 
[Insert Table 5] 
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4.5. Sub-sample Analysis.  
Table 5 reports the results of analysis after partitioning the sample based on 
volatility and state ownership. In columns 1 and 2, the sample is partitioned into 
two groups with more or less volatile profits in the past eight quarters. I find that 
MANDATORY_PRE is significantly positive in both sub-samples, suggesting that 
the mandatory forecast requirement encourages voluntary disclosure. 
 
In addition, I find that MANDATORY_PROP and VOLUNTARY_PROP are 
significantly positive for those firms with a relatively lower volatility. The results 
suggest that both voluntary and mandatory forecasters generate pressure on these 
firms to make voluntary disclosures. However, for those firms with a relatively 
higher volatility MANDATORY_PROP is statistically insignificant and 
VOLUNTARY_PROP is significantly positive. These results suggest that only 
voluntary forecasters are able to generate pressure on these firms. The absence of 
significant pressure from mandatory forecasters on firms in a more-volatile 
business environment may be due to the greater forecasting difficulty faced by 
managers. If the majority of forecasters are mandatory rather than voluntary, 
market participation may not punish these firms heavily and thus the cost of 
non-disclosure is low. However, the cost of non-disclosure for a particular firm will 
increase substantially if a large number of firms in the industry have issued 
forecasts voluntarily. The reasoning above may explain why pressure from 
voluntary forecasters is significant and stronger for firms in a highly volatile 
business environment.   
 
[Insert Table 6] 
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I further partition the sample based on state ownership. I find that 
MANDATORY_PRE is economically significant for both SOEs and non-SOEs. The 
results suggest that the selective mandatory forecast requirement promotes 
voluntary disclosure for firms with different types of ownership. In contrast, peer 
effects are more observable in non-SOEs than in SOEs: peer effects from 
mandatory forecasters are significant in both sub-samples while peer effects from 
voluntary forecasters are only significant in non-SOEs. A plausible explanation is 
that SOEs in China have less need to please investors and compete with peer firms, 
because they are often protected in product markets and enjoy better access to 
finance. (Lu et al., 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
Chapter 5. Management Earnings Forecast Quality 
In Chapter 3, I found that the management earnings forecast quality, which is 
judged on the basis of PRECISION, ERROR and BIAS (see the Appendix for 
definitions of variables), improves over the sample period. In this section, I 
investigate the forces underlying the improvement in the quality of the 
management earnings forecasts.  
 
5.1. Variables for Testing Peer Effects on Disclosure Quality. 
I use the industry-average management earnings forecast quality in the previous 
year (excluding the forecasting quality of the focal firm) as a proxy for industry 
peer effects. The variables are PEER_PRECISION, PEER_ERROR and 
PEER_BIAS (see the Appendix for definitions of variables). Higher values for 
PEER_PRECISION and lower values for PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS indicate 
that the forecasting quality of peer firms is higher. If pressure from peer firms 
promotes improved management earnings forecast quality, I should find a positive 
association between the industry-average earnings forecast quality in the previous 
year and the firm’s forecast quality.  
 
5.2. Variables for Testing the Effects of Forecasting Experience on Disclosure 
Quality. 
To examine whether more forecasting experience leads to higher forecast quality, I 
use MF_YEARS to account for the forecasting experience accumulated by firms. 
MF_YEARS is defined as the number of years that the firm has issued management 
earnings forecasts. If management earnings forecast quality increases as firms gain 
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more experience, I should find a positive association between MF_YEARS and 
forecast quality.  
 
5.3. Empirical Design. 
To test my hypotheses, I regress industry pressure and firms’ forecasting experience 
on various aspects of management earnings forecast quality and control variables 
including MANDATORY, HORIZON, NEWS, ROA, VOL, LST, SIZE, M/B, LEV, 
OUT, INST, DUALIT, MEETING TOP, ANALYST, SOE, MINDEX and ACCRUAL 
(see the Appendix for definitions of variables): 
PRECISION = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1PEER_PRECISION + 𝛼2MF_YEARS + Control Variables                                                         
(2)                                
ERROR = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1PEER_ ERROR + 𝛼2MF_YEARS + Control Variables    (3) 
BIAS = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1PEER_ BIAS + 𝛼2MF_YEARS + Control Variables        (4)                                                                   
 
Because PRECISION is an ordinal variable, I use an ordered Probit model to 
estimate model (2). I estimate models (3) and (4) using Ordinary Least Squares. I 
use standard errors clustered at both the firm and the year levels. I also control for 
year and industry fixed effects in all of the models.  
 
I add several factors that might affect management earnings forecast quality. First, I 
control for forecast type (MANDATORY) because the incentive to issue a voluntary 
forecast is different from the incentive to issue a mandatory forecast. Many studies 
(Brockman et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2013; Gong et al., 2011; Gong et al., 2009; 
Rogers and Stocken, 2005) find that manager incentives affect forecasting quality. I 
include the length of the forecasting horizon (HORIZON) because studies such as 
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those of Bamber and Cheon (1998), Baginski et al. (2002), Ajinkya et al. (2005) 
and Cheng et al. (2013) suggest that the quality of management earnings forecasts 
is highly correlated with the length of the forecasting horizon. Following Ajinkya 
et al. (2005), I further include news (NEWS) to control for litigation. I also control 
for return on assets (ROA) because Gong et al. (2009) find a positive relationship 
between ROA and forecast error. In addition, because forecasting difficulty is 
closely associated with forecast quality (Cheng et al., 2013; Rogers and Stocken, 
2005), I include profit volatility as a proxy for forecasting difficulty. Moreover, 
research suggests that firms are more likely to provide high-quality earnings 
forecasts when the market demands more information (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Cheng 
et al., 2013). Thus, I include the number of listing years (LST), firm size (SIZE), 
firm growth opportunities (M/B), analyst coverage (ANALYST), leverage ratio (LEV) 
and state ownership (SOE) to capture the market demand for information. To 
control for the effect of corporate governance on disclosure quality, I add various 
other factors: the proportion of outside directors (OUT), the proportion of shares 
held by institutions (INST), CEO duality (DUALIT), the number of board meetings 
(MEETING) and the percentage of shares held by the largest 10 shareholders (TOP) 
(Ajinkya et al., 2005; Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Cheng et al., 2013; Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005). Due to a firm’s behavior being associated with the market 
development in the firm’s location (Firth et al., 2011), I include MINDEX to control 
for the market development in the province in which the firm is located. Finally, I 
control for total accruals (ACCRUAL) because Gong et al. (2009) find that forecast 
bias is associated with accruals in the previous year. 
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5.4. Main Analysis. 
Panel A of Table 7 outlines the descriptive statistics for my sample of 10,725 
observations. The average precision (PRECISION) and average forecast error 
(ERROR) are 1.624 and 0.303, respectively. Similar to studies conducted in the U.S. 
(e.g. Gong et al. 2009), I find that the average bias (BIAS) (0.163) is positive, 
suggesting that management earnings forecasts in China are also more likely to be 
optimistically biased. The average experience of forecasting firms (MF_YEARS) is 
about 4.67 years; the average values of peer precision (PEER_PRECISION), peer 
error (PEER_ERROR) and peer bias (PEER_BIAS) are 1.577, 0.362 and 0.208, 
respectively. On average, 61.6% of the forecasts are mandatory. Of the mandatory 
earnings forecasts, 3,374 are good forecasts and 3,231 are bad forecasts. The mean 
values of error (FIRST_ERROR) and bias (FIRST_BIAS) for the first forecasts 
issued by firms are 0.569 and 0.366, respectively, which are higher than the mean 
forecast error (ERROR) and the mean forecast bias (BIAS). Similarly, the average 
precision (FIRST_PRECISION) of a firm’s first forecast is 1.24, which is lower 
than the average forecast precision (PRECISION). This is not surprising, as the 
quality of management earnings forecasts improves over the years, as shown in 
Chapter 3. 
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
Panel B of Table 7 contains pairwise correlations between forecast quality, 
forecasting experience, peer forecasting quality and other regressors. All of the 
correlation results are consistent with my expectations. Both MF_YEARS and 
PEER_PRECISION are positively correlated with PRECISION. MF_YEARS is 
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negatively correlated with ERROR and BIAS. Finally, the correlation between 
PEER_ERROR and ERROR and that between PEER_BIAS and BIAS are positive. 
Furthermore, given the magnitude of the correlation between the independent 
variables and PRECISION (ERROR or BIAS), I conclude that the tests are not 
subject to multi-collinearity. 
 
Univariate comparisons are presented in Table 8. Panel A presents the means for 
firm forecasting experience (MF_YEARS), industry average forecast precision 
(PEER_PRECISION) and forecast type (MANDATORY) across high- and 
low-precision portfolios. The differences in the means for MF_YEARS, 
PEER_PRECISION and MANDATORY for high- and low-precision forecasts are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that learning effects and peer 
effects are important determinants of forecast precision. This also implies that 
mandatory forecasts tend to be less precise than voluntary forecasts. The results of 
univariate analysis of the determinants of forecast accuracy are presented in Panel 
B of Table 8. The mean number of forecasting years (MF_YEARS) is significantly 
greater in the more accurate portfolio, while industry forecast error (PEER_ERROR) 
is significantly larger in the less accurate portfolio. However, I find no difference in 
accuracy between voluntary and mandatory forecasts. Panel C of Table 8 presents 
the univariate statistics separately for sub-samples of forecasts with different levels 
of bias. Managers with more earnings forecasting experience (MF_YEARS) tend to 
issue less-optimistically biased forecasts than managers with less forecasting 
experience (MF_YEARS), and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. Moreover, if peer earnings forecasts are more conservative on 
average in the previous year (PEER_BIAS), then firms have a higher likelihood of 
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issuing less-optimistically biased forecasts. Finally, MANDATORY also differs 
significantly between less-optimistically biased and more-optimistically biased 
portfolios. Overall, the evidence from the univariate analysis is consistent with my 
expectations. 
 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
Table 9 reports the results of analyzing the link between management earnings 
forecast quality and firms’ forecasting experience and peer firm forecast quality. 
Column 1 shows the analysis when the dependent variable is PRECISION. As 
expected, the coefficient of MF_YEARS is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, 
suggesting that earnings forecasts tend to be more precise if the forecaster has more 
forecasting experience. Thus, it appears that firms with more forecasting 
experience are more likely to make more-specific disclosures. Although the 
coefficient for PEER_PRECISION is positive but insignificant, this still implies a 
positive peer effect on forecasting precision. Of the control variables, those that 
capture corporate governance, DUALIT, MEETING and TOP, are all statistically 
significant, suggesting that the precision of management earnings forecasts is 
closely associated with corporate governance.  
 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
Column 2 of Table 9 presents the correlation results for industry average forecast 
error, forecasting experience and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts. 
Firm forecasting experience (MF_YEARS) is, as expected, positively (negatively) 
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correlated with management earnings forecast accuracy (ERROR), with the 
coefficient being statistically significant at the 0.01 level. If the forecasts of peer 
firms are more accurate (contain less error), this puts pressure on other firms to 
issue more-accurate forecasts. The regression result reflects this phenomenon: the 
coefficient for PEER_ERROR is positively associated with the forecast error and is 
statistically significant at the conventional level. Of the control variables, 
MANDATORY, SIZE and INST are influential. The coefficient for MANDATORY is 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that mandatory 
management earnings forecasts are less accurate than voluntary forecasts. 
Voluntary forecasters are supposed to have more incentive to disclose information 
to investors and thus have more motivation to provide accurate forecasts. The 
coefficient of SIZE is also positively correlated with the dependent variable and is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This finding implies that larger firms issue 
less-accurate earnings forecasts because it may be more difficult for them to make 
forecasts in comparison with small firms. The negative coefficient on INST 
suggests that firms with more institutional investors tend to issue more-accurate 
earnings forecasts.  
 
Column 3 of Table 9 presents regression results for peer effect, forecasting 
experience and bias in management earnings forecasts. Firm forecasting experience, 
proxied by MF_YEARS, is negatively associated with BIAS. Thus, it seems that 
firms with more forecasting experience are likely to produce more-conservative 
forecasts (less-optimistic bias). Consistent with my expectations, the coefficient for 
PEER_BIAS is positive and statistically significant at the conventional level, 
implying that firms tend to issue less-optimistically biased earnings forecasts if 
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their peer firms’ forecasts are less-optimistically biased. Of the control variables, 
the coefficient for NEWS is influential and significantly positive at the 0.01 level, 
implying that firms tend to optimistically bias earnings forecasts if they have good 
news.  
 
MANDATORY is also interesting in terms of explaining forecasting bias: the results 
show that mandatory forecasts are less accurate and more biased than voluntary 
forecasts, and suggest that disclosures issued under managers’ own initiative are of 
a higher quality than disclosures issued under the mandatory requirement. More 
importantly, the results indicate that the management earnings forecast regulation is 
successful, leading to more and higher-quality voluntary disclosures. 
 
On the whole, my evidence suggests that the forecasting performance of peer firms 
is the benchmark when firms are considering their own forecast quality. These 
results are also consistent with my expectation that forecasting experience is 
associated with management earnings forecast quality. Firms with more forecasting 
experience tend to issue more-specific, more-accurate and less-biased forecasts.  
 
5.5. Additional Tests. 
A concern with the foregoing findings is that firms with better forecasting 
performance are more likely to issue forecasts and thereby accumulate more 
forecasting experience. Another concern is that unobservable factors associated 
with firm characteristics might be important determinants of forecast quality. To 
alleviate such concerns, I include the quality of firms’ first forecasts, i.e. 
FIRST_PRECISION, FIRST_ERROR and FIRST_BIAS, in columns 1-3 of Table 10. 
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This is because the quality of firms’ first forecasts captures unobservable factors 
related to the quality of the current forecasts and captures firms’ past forecasting 
performance. I do not use the quality of firms’ last forecasts because this is highly 
correlated with current forecast quality. In these regressions, I eliminate the firms’ 
first forecasts from the sample to avoid perfect collinearity. As shown, forecasting 
experience (MF_YEARS) continues to be statistically significant at the 
conventional level, suggesting that firms with a longer forecasting history tend to 
issue more-precise, more-accurate and less-biased forecasts. Consistent with the 
previous finding, there is a positive association between the forecast precision of a 
firm and that of its peers, but the effect is not significant. Similarly, I find that the 
forecast accuracy and bias of firms are significantly influenced by those of its peers. 
Collectively, the results corroborate my previous findings.  
 
To pursue forecast accuracy, managers may sacrifice forecast precision. Thus, in 
additional tests I control for the effect of forecast precision (columns 4-5 of Table 
10) on forecast error and bias, respectively. The results for MF_YEARS, 
PEER_PRECISION and PEER_BIAS confirm the previous finding that a firm’s 
forecast quality is affected by its forecasting experience and the average forecast 
quality of its peer firms. 
 
Finally, columns 6-7 of Table 10 report the results after controlling for the quality 
of a firm’s first forecast and the forecast precision in the current period. The 
coefficients for MF_YEARS remain negative and statistically significant at the 
conventional level when the dependent variables are forecast error and bias. 
Overall, these findings suggest that the learning effect is an important determinant 
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of forecast error and forecast bias. Further, consistent with the previous results, 
PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS continue to be associated with forecast error and 
forecast bias, respectively, suggesting that managers take into account the quality 
of peer firms’ forecasts when issuing their own forecasts. Finally, I find that 
MANDATORY is consistently effective in explaining forecast quality, suggesting 
that voluntary forecasts are of a higher quality than mandatory forecasts.  
 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
5.6. Endogeneity Tests. 
A concern relating to peer effects on forecast quality is that the common variables 
shared among firm and peer groups may determine forecast quality. In my main 
test, I include an industry dummy to mitigate this concern. To further address this 
issue, I include two instrumental variables and use the two-stage method to 
re-estimate my model. Following Leary and Roberts (2014), my first instrument 
variable is peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return because this is unlikely to be 
correlated with firm characteristics (Leary and Roberts, 2014). Moreover, previous 
research (Cheng et al., 2013; Rogers and Stocken, 2005) shows that forecasting 
difficulty is associated with forecast quality and can be proxied by idiosyncratic 
equity return. My second instrumental variable is peer firms’ forecasting 
experience, which is unlikely to affect individual the forecast quality of individual 
firms but is possibly correlated with the forecast quality of peer firms. Hence, I 
estimate the effect of peer firms’ forecast quality on firm forecast quality by using 
peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return and peer firms’ forecasting experience. I 
estimate the fitted value of peer firms’ forecast quality relating to 
 (6) 
PEER_BIAS= a0 + a1PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK + a2 PEER_MF_YEARS 
(7) 
where PEER_EQUJTY_SHOCK is the industry average idiosyncratic stock return 
(excluding the focal firm). 
I estimate the idiosyncratic stock return with the following Carhart (1997) four 
factor model. 
Ri,t = a0 + a1 (Rm,t-Rj t) + a2 SMBt + a3 HMLt + a4 UMDt 
(8) 
where R;, 1 refers to the excessive stock return for firm i over month t. Rm,1-R;; ,, 
SMB1 , HML1 and UMD, are the excessive market return, the small minus big 
portfolio return, the high minus low portfolio return a�d the momentum portfolio 
return, respectively. I estimate equation (8) for each firm using a monthly rolling 
regression, requiring at least 20 months of historical data and using up to 24 
months of data in the estimations. After obtaining the coefficients, I then use 
equation (8) to calculate the expected return. The idiosyncratic return is the actual 
return minus the expected return. Because peer firms' forecast quality relating to 
PEER_PRECISJON, PEER ERROR and PEER BIAS is the industry-average 
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PEER_PRECISION, PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS from the first-stage 
estimation in model (5), (6) and (7) and replace these in the second-stage 
regression in models (2), (3) and (4). 
PEER_PRECISION =𝛼0+𝛼1PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK + 𝛼2 PEER_MF_YEARS   
(5) 
PEER_ERROR =𝛼0 +𝛼1PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK + 𝛼2 PEER_MF_YEARS 
  (6) 
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forecast quality in the previous year, I thus require the idiosyncratic stock return to
be the average monthly idiosyncratic stock return in the previous year. 
Table 11 reports the results obtained using two-stage model. The coefficients 
for peer firms’ forecast quality relating to PEER_PRECISION, PEER_ERROR 
and PEER_BIAS are consistent with previous findings shown in Table 9. 
More importantly, as shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 11, the 
coefficients for PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS are statistically significant, 
indicating that peer firms’ forecast accuracy and peer firms’ forecast bias affect 
the forecast accuracy and bias, respectively, of individual firms. This shows 
that my main results are unlikely to be affected by endogeneity issues. 
[Insert Table 11] 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
China introduced a unique regulation in 2000 that required publicly listed firms in 
China to make earnings forecasts under certain conditions. Since the introduction 
of this regulation, China has witnessed an increase in the quantity of both 
mandatory management earnings forecasts and voluntary earnings forecasts. 
Furthermore, there has been a substantial and consistent improvement in the quality 
of the forecasts issued by firms. In this study, I examine the factors that have driven 
the emergence of these voluntary forecasts and the improvement in their quality.  
Regarding the determinants of the voluntary disclosure of management earnings 
forecasts, I find that firms are more likely to make a voluntary disclosure if they 
were required to make a disclosure in the preceding year. Furthermore, I find that 
peer pressure motivates firms to voluntarily issue forward-looking information. I 
find that learning and peer effects are the most important determinants of 
management earnings forecast quality.   
Overall, this study provides evidence in support of the argument that the 
introduction of the selective mandatory forecast requirement in China may have 
had firm-level, market-wide and intertemporal effects. These effects have 
encouraged firms to issue forecasts voluntarily and to improve the quality of their 
forecasts. The findings of this study contribute to the literature on management 
earnings forecasts and to the literature on financial reporting regulations. They also 
have practical relevance for investors and policy implications for regulators in 
China and other countries.  
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Appendix: 
Variable Definitions 
Forecast Outcome Factors: 
 
VOLUNTARY = 1 if the earnings forecast firm issues is voluntary forecast, and 
0 otherwise. The forecast is classified as voluntary if it does not 
meet the following conditions: (a) more than 50% change in 
profits; (b) making loss; (c) turning from loss-making to profit 
making. 
 
PRECISION = a measure of management earnings forecast precision. It is 3 
for point forecast, 2 for rang forecast, 1 for open-ended forecast 
and 0 for qualitative forecast. 
 
ERROR = absolute value [(management forecast of profit-actual profit) / 
(shares outstanding×price at the beginning of the fiscal year)]. 
It is a measure of forecast error. 
 
  
BIAS = [(management forecast of profit-actual profit) / (shares 
outstanding×price at the beginning of the fiscal year)]. It is a 
measure of forecast bias. 
  
  
Measures of Selective Disclosure Requirement Effects: 
 
PRE_MANDATORY = 1 if firm has been required to issue management earnings 
forecast in the past one year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Measures of Peer Effects: 
 
MANDATORY_PROP = the proportion of firms in the industry which have issued 
mandatory management earnings forecasts in the past one year 
(excluding the focal firm). The industry classification is 
downloaded from WIND database which divides firms into 28 
industries. 
 
VOLUNTARY_PROP = the proportion of firms in the industry which have issued 
voluntary management earnings forecasts in the past one year 
(excluding the focal firm). The industry classification is 
downloaded from WIND database which divides firms into 28 
industries. 
 
PEER_PRECISION = the industry average precision of all management earnings 
forecasts issued in the past one year (excluding the focal firm). 
The industry classification is downloaded from WIND database 
which divides firms into 28 industries. 
 
PEER_ERROR = the industry average error of all management earnings 
forecasts issued in the past one year (excluding the focal firm). 
The industry classification is downloaded from WIND database 
which divides firms into 28 industries. 
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PEER_BIAS = the absolute value of the industry average bias of all 
management earnings forecasts issued in the past one year 
(excluding the focal firm). The industry classification is 
downloaded from WIND database which divides firms into 28 
industries. 
  
Measures of Forecasting Experience: 
 
MF_YEARS = number of years that the firm has issued management earnings 
forecasts. 
 
Other Variables: 
 
PRE_VOLUNTARY = 1 if firm has issued management earnings forecast voluntarily 
in the past one year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
NEWS = 1 if the current-forecasting-period profit is larger than or equal 
to the profit of the same forecasting period in the last year, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
HORIZON = number of days between the forecast date and the end of 
forecasting period.  
 
MANDATORY = 1 if the earnings forecast firm issues is mandatory forecast, 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
ROA = return on assets. 
 
VOL = the natural logarithm of standard deviation of quarterly profits 
over past 8 quarters. It captures the forecasting difficulty. 
 
LST = the number of the year since the firm is listed.  
 
SIZE = firm’s market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
M/B = a ratio of market value to the book value of equity measured 
at the beginning of the year. 
 
LEV = a ratio of total liability to the book value of equity at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
OUT = proportion of outside directors. 
 
INST = proportion of shares held by institutions.  
 
DUALIT = 1 if CEO and chairman positions are possessed by the same 
person.  
 
MEETING = the number of board meetings held annually. 
 
TOP = percentage of shares held by the largest 10 shareholders. 
 
ANALYST = number of analysts following the firm.  
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SOE =1 if the firm is the state-owned enterprise, and 0 otherwise. 
 
MINDEX = a comprehensive index of provincial market development.  
 
ACCRUAL = a measure of total accruals in prior year. It is (the change in 
non-cash current assets - the change in current liabilities 
excluding the current proportion of long-term debt – 
depreciation and amortization)/lagged total assets 
 
FIRST_ERROR = the error of firm’s first forecast. 
 
FIRST_BIAS = the bias of firm’s first forecast 
 
FIRST_PRECISION = the precision of firm’s first forecast. 
 
PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK = the industry average idiosyncratic stock return in the past one 
year (excluding the focal firm). The idiosyncratic stock return in 
the past one year is the monthly average idiosyncratic stock 
return in the past one year. The industry classification is 
downloaded from WIND database which divides firms into 28 
industries. 
 
PEER_MF_YEARS = the industry average forecasting experience (excluding the 
focal firm). The forecasting experience is measured by the 
number of years that the firm has issued management earnings 
forecasts. The industry classification is downloaded from 
WIND database which divides firms into 28 industries. 
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Table 1.The Development of Management Earnings Forecast Regulation 
 
Year Conditions 
2000 1. Making losses; 
2001 1. Making losses; 
2. More than 50% changes in earnings;  
3. Small earnings (before taxes) per share last year 
(smaller than 0.05) can be exempt. 
2006 1. Making losses; 
2. More than 50% changes in earnings;  
3. Small earnings (before taxes) per share last year (0.05 
for annual, 0.03 for interim report, 0.04 for the third 
quarterly reports) can be exempt. 
4. Turning from loss-making to profit-making. 
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Table 2. Sample Selection and Description 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure 
Initial sample of all forecasts 
 29,908 
Less:  
 
 Pre-announcements 
(13,523) 
 Accounting data unavailable 
  (5,660) 
Usable forecasts 
10,725 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts 
Year Number of Voluntary 
Forecasts 
Number of Total 
Forecasts 
Proportion of Voluntary 
Forecasts 
2007 104 1,076 10% 
2008 165 962 17% 
2009 360 1,314 27% 
2010 465 1,435 32% 
2011 640 1,405 46% 
2012 1,069 2,057 52% 
2013 1,320 2,479 53% 
 
Panel C: Distribution of Voluntary Forecasters 
Year Number of Voluntary 
Forecasters 
Number of Total 
Forecasters 
Proportion of Voluntary 
Forecasters 
2007 61 515 12% 
2008 106 493 22% 
2009 206 623 33% 
2010 207 602 34% 
2011 314 615 51% 
2012 485 852 57% 
2013 605 1,004 60% 
 
Year  Qualitative Open-ended Range Point 
2007 337 382 241 116 
2008 248 288 308 116 
2009 270 212 563 268 
2010 231 170 867 167 
2011 173 168 981 83 
2012 205 172 1,622 58 
2013 194 167 2,084 34 
TOTAL 1,658 1,559 6,666 842 
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Figure 1. Trends of Management Earnings Forecast Quality 
 
Panel A. Trends of Average Forecast Precision 
 
This panel presents the mean management earnings forecast precision (PRECISION) and mean 
voluntary (VOLUNTARY) management earnings forecast precision (PRECISION) over the 
sample period. PRECISION and VOLUNTARY are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
Panel B. Trends of Average Forecast Error 
 
This panel presents the mean management earnings forecast error (ERROR) and mean 
voluntary (VOLUNTARY) management earnings forecast error (ERROR) over the sample 
period. ERROR and VOLUNTARY are defined in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C. Trends of Average Forecast Bias 
 
This panel presents the mean management earnings forecast bias (BIAS) and mean voluntary 
(VOLUNTARY) management earnings forecast bias (BIAS) over the sample period. BIAS and 
VOLUNTARY are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Key Variables for Testing H1, H2a and H2b 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
VOLUNTARY 0.131 0.337 0 1.000 28,909 
MANDATORY_PRE 0.302 0.459 0 1.000 28,909 
MANDATORY_PROP 0.394 0.108 0.209 0.588 28,909 
VOLUNTARY_PROP 0.183 0.126 0 0.511 28,909 
VOLUNTARY_PRE  0.198 0.399 0 1.000 28,909 
NEWS 0.600 0.490 0 1.000 28,909 
ROA 0.028 0.186 -0.722 28.529 28,909 
VOL 16.881 1.344 11.960 24.641 28,909 
LST 10.753 5.021 1.786 23.074 28,909 
SIZE 22.141 0.967 18.555 28.125 28,909 
M/B 3.387 3.272 0.502 23.141 28,909 
LEV 1.496 1.783 0.055 12.431 28,909 
OUT 0.364 0.052 0.091 0.714 28,909 
INST 0.150 0.169 0 0.980 28,909 
DUALIT 0.177 0.382 0 1.000 28,909 
MEETING 9.365 3.797 1.000 57.000 28,909 
TOP 29.441 21.465 0.303 96.139 28,909 
ANALYST 10.779 11.510 0 58.000 28,909 
SOE 0.554 0.497 0 1.000 28,909 
MINDEX 8.884 2.106 0.380 11.800 28,909 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
ACCRUAL -0.003 0.071 -0.539 0.741 28,909 
This panel provides descriptive statistics on variables for the firms that issued voluntary forecasts and those that issued neither voluntary forecasts nor mandatory 
forecasts in the period 2007-2013. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Correlations among Regression Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
VOLUNTARY MANDATORY_PRE MANDATORY_PROP VOLUNTARY_PROP 
(1) 1 
 
0.053 *** 0.025  0.28 *** 
(2) 0.052 *** 1 
 
0.127  -0.07 *** 
(3) 0.02 *** 0.132 *** 1  0.021 *** 
(4) 0.289 *** -0.067 *** 0.03  1  
*, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively. 
This panel provides correlations among the key variables for the firms that issued voluntary forecasts and those that issued neither voluntary forecasts nor 
mandatory forecasts in the period 2007-2013. Pearson correlations are shown above diagonal and Spearman correlations are shown below diagonal. 
See Appendix for variable definitions 
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Table 4. Univariate Analysis of Determinants of Voluntary Participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
VOLUNTARY=1 VOLUNTARY=0 p-value of difference 
PRE_MANDATORY 0.364 0.293 <0.01 
MANDATORY_PROP 0.277 0.169 <0.01 
VOLUNTARY_PROP 0.364 0.293 <0.01 
This table provides univariate comparisons on key variables between firms that involve in 
voluntary disclosure and those that neither do voluntary forecasts nor mandatory forecasts. 
The p-values of the difference in means are based on t-tests. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 5. Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure of Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
  Main Tests 
VARIABLES VOLUNTARY 
MANDATORY_PRE 0.542*** 
 (0.041) 
MANDATORY_PROP 0.990* 
 (0.559) 
VOLUNTARY_PROP 1.149** 
 (0.578) 
VOLUNTARY_PRE 1.983*** 
 (0.026) 
NEWS 0.0184 
 (0.024) 
ROA 0.130* 
 (0.071) 
VOL -0.145*** 
 (0.028) 
LST 0.00135 
 (0.003) 
SIZE 0.00285 
 (0.026) 
M/B -0.0108 
 (0.009) 
LEV -0.0532*** 
 (0.012) 
OUT -0.349 
 (0.262) 
INST 0.496*** 
 (0.160) 
DUALIT 0.0628** 
 (0.027) 
MEETING -0.00841* 
 (0.004) 
TOP 0.00161 
 (0.001) 
ANALYST 0.0146*** 
 (0.002) 
SOE -0.340*** 
 (0.035) 
MINDEX 0.0226*** 
 
(0.007) 
ACCRUAL -0.329* 
 
(0.194) 
Constant -0.697 
 
(0.830) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Year Effect YES 
Industry Effect YES 
  Pseudo R2  0.5063 
Observations 28,909 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively. 
This table provides regression results on the relation between voluntary disclosure decision and 
selective disclosure requirement effects and peer effects.  
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
 
Table 6: Sub-sample Analysis of the Selective Management Earnings Forecast Effects and Peer Effects on Voluntary Disclosure of Management 
Earnings Forecast 
 
 Sum-sample Analysis  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Volatility State Ownership 
  High Low SOE Non-SOE 
MANDATORY_PRE 0.594*** 0.524*** 0.601*** 0.528*** 
  (0.060) (0.045) (0.051) (0.054) 
Test of difference in 𝛼1 0.070  0.073 
   
MANDATORY_PROP 0.484 1.417** 0.34 1.345* 
  (0.690) (0.561) (0.585) (0.704) 
Test of difference in 𝛼2  -0.933  -1.005 
      
VOLUNTARY_PROP 1.266*** 1.311* 1.301** 1.419* 
  (0.481) (0.718) (0.514) (0.818) 
Test of difference in 𝛼3  -0.045*  -0.118 
  
    Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
 
Year Effect YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES 
     
Pseudo R2  0.515 0.4847 0.4789 0.4545 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Observations 13,618 14,966 15,982 12,880 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent (two-tail), respectively. 
This table provides regression results on the voluntary disclosure analysis after partitioning the sample on 
volatility and state ownership 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Key Variables for Testing H3 and H4 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Observations 
MF_YEARS 4.666 2.061 1 13.000 10,725 
PRECISION 1.624 0.838 0 3.000 10,725 
ERROR 0.303 0.761 0.000 4.778 8,100 
BIAS 0.146 0.721 -2.003 4.177 8,100 
PEER_PRECISION 1.557 0.316 0.667 1.963 8,100 
PEER_ERROR 0.362 0.418 0.003 2.694 8,100 
PEER_BIAS 0.208 0.374 0.001 2.367 10,725 
MANDATORY 0.616 0.486 0 1.000 10,725 
HORIZON 54.510 19.740 1.000 331.000 10,725 
NEWS 0.610 0.488 0 1.000 10,725 
ROA 0.033 0.228 -2.898 20.790 10,725 
VOL 16.800 1.244 13.040 24.270 10,725 
LST 7.412 4.866 1.580 21.700 10,725 
SIZE 22.000 0.907 19.280 28.230 10,725 
M/B 3.502 3.266 0.534 22.770 10,725 
LEV 1.322 1.648 0.047 11.500 10,725 
OUT 0.364 0.051 0.091 0.667 10,725 
INST 0.165 0.181 0 0.957 10,725 
DUALIT 0.254 0.435 0 1.000 10,725 
MEETING 9.127 3.333 1 35.000 10,725 
TOP 27.800 21.490 0.303 96.000 10,725 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
ANALYST 11.390 10.990 0 55.000 10,725 
SOE 0.382 0.486 0 1.000 10,725 
MINDEX 9.264 2.055 0.380 11.800 10,725 
ACCRUAL -0.001 0.095 -0.539 0.501 10,725 
FIRST_PRECISION 1.235 0.883 0 3.000 10,528 
FIRST_ERROR 0.569 0.928 0.000 3.360 4,081 
FIRST_BIAS 0.366 0.912 -0.863 3.153 4,081 
This panel provides descriptive statistics on variables for the firms which issued either mandatory forecasts or voluntary forecasts in the period 2007-2013. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Correlations among Regression Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 MF_YEARS PRECISION ERROR BIAS PEER_PRECISION PEER_ERROR PEER_BIAS FIRST_PRECISION  FIRST_ERROR  FIRST_ BIAS 
(1) 1  0.058 *** -0.173 *** -0.107  0.153 *** -0.128 *** -0.09 *** -0.215 *** 0.054 *** 0.015  
(2) 0.103 *** 1  -0.151 *** -0.12 *** 0.233 *** 0.119 *** 0.067 *** 0.307 *** -0.077 *** -0.064 *** 
(3) -0.193 *** -0.085 *** 1  0.395 *** -0.217 *** 0.34 *** 0.328 *** -0.112 *** 0.294 *** 0.193 *** 
(4) -0.147 *** -0.05 *** 0.562 *** 1  -0.067 *** 0.127 *** 0.154 *** -0.005  0.144 *** 0.229 *** 
(5) 0.175 *** 0.269 *** -0.322 *** -0.25  1  -0.441 *** -0.349 *** 0.271 *** -0.119 *** -0.066 *** 
(6) -0.167 *** 0.083 *** 0.275 *** 0.196  -0.479 *** 1  0.719 *** -0.199 *** 0.123 *** 0.042 *** 
(7) -0.146 *** 0.043 *** 0.277 *** 0.222  -0.465 *** 0.904 *** 1  -0.147 *** 0.115 *** 0.063 *** 
(8) -0.238 *** -0.005  -0.025 *** 0.007  -0.086 *** -0.005  0.01  1  -0.104 *** -0.044 *** 
(9) -0.014  -0.023 ** 0.4 *** 0.258 *** -0.145 *** 0.12 *** 0.118 *** -0.213 *** 1  0.472 *** 
(10) -0.02  -0.019 * 0.362 *** 0.363 *** -0.163 *** 0.105 *** 0.11 *** -0.107 *** 0.761 ** 1  
*, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively. 
This panel provides correlations among the key variables for the firms which issued either mandatory forecasts or voluntary forecasts in the period 2007-2013. Pearson 
correlations are shown above diagonal and Spearman correlations are shown below diagonal. 
See Appendix for variable definitions 
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Table 8. Univariate Analysis of Determinants of Forecast Quality 
Panel A:  
  Mean 
 
High Precision Low Precision p-value of difference 
MF_YEARS 4.593 5.520 <0.01 
PEER_PRECISION 1.590 1.419 <0.01 
MANDATORY 0.587 0.950 <0.01 
This table provides univariate comparisons on key variables between firms which issue more 
precise forecasts (High Precision) and firms which issue less precise forecasts (Low Precision). 
The P-values of the difference in means are based on t-tests. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Panel B: 
  Mean 
 
Low Error High Error p-value of difference 
MF_YEARS 4.971 4.377 <0.01 
PEER_ERROR 0.267 0.458 <0.01 
MANDATORY 0.530 0.533 >0.1 
This table provides univariate comparisons on key variables between firms which issue more 
accurate forecasts (Low Error) and firms which issue less accurate forecasts (High Error). The 
P-values of the difference in means are based on t-tests. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Panel C: 
  Mean 
 Low Bias High Bias p-value of difference 
MF_YEARS 4.943 4.404 <0.01 
PEER_BIAS 0.173 0.244 <0.01 
MANDATORY 0.471 0.592 <0.01 
This table provides univariate comparisons on key variables between firms which issue less 
biased forecasts (Low Bias) and firms which issue more biased forecasts (High Bias). The 
P-values of the difference in means are based on t-tests. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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 Table 9. Determinants of Management Earnings Forecast Quality 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
 
PRECISION ERROR BIAS 
 
MF_YEARS 0.0991*** -0.0322*** -0.0187** 
 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
PEER_PRECISION 0.0214    
 (0.141)    
PEER_ERROR 0.144** 
 
 
 
 
(0.061) 
 
 
PEER_BIAS 
 
0.233*** 
 
   
(0.065) 
 
MANDATORY -0.0576** 0.197*** 0.104*** 
 
 
(0.027) (0.020) (0.019) 
 
HORIZON -0.00172*** 0.00111*** 0.000193 
 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
NEWS 0.0945*** -0.0199 0.372*** 
 
 
(0.033) (0.030) (0.024) 
 
ROA 0.211 1.028 0.685 
 
 
(0.142) (0.696) (0.483) 
 
VOL -0.0331* 0.0159 -0.0256** 
 
 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.011) 
 
LST -0.0423*** -0.00411 0.0022 
 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
SIZE -0.105*** 0.105*** 0.0865*** 
 
 
(0.032) (0.024) (0.021) 
 
M/B -0.00312 -0.0363*** -0.0213*** 
 
 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
LEV -0.0732*** 0.000125 0.0181* 
 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
OUT 0.113 -0.139*** -0.0767 
 
 
(0.080) (0.051) (0.049) 
 
INST 0.0466 -0.0520*** -0.0320* 
 
 
(0.034) (0.020) (0.018) 
 
DUALIT 0.0132** -0.000684 0.0059 
 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
MEETING -0.00367*** 0.00255*** 0.00150*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
TOP 0.00480** 0.00151 0.000403 
 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
ANALYST -0.0576** 0.197*** 0.104***  
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.019)  
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
SOE -0.0417 -0.107*** -0.0636** 
 
 
(0.042) (0.029) (0.027) 
 
MINDEX -0.0217** 0.0150** 0.00405 
 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
ACCRUAL -0.198 -0.0624 -0.219** 
 
 
(0.178) (0.108) (0.103) 
 
cut1 -3.381*** 
  
 
 
(0.609) 
  
 
cut2 -2.807*** 
  
 
 
(0.609) 
  
 
cut3 -0.768 
  
 
 
(0.610) 
  
 
Constant 
 
-1.155** -0.671 
 
  
(0.479) (0.415) 
 
    
 
Year Effect YES YES YES 
 
Industry Effect YES YES YES 
 
    
 
Observations 10,725 8,100 8,100 
 
R-squared 0.0601 0.28 0.279 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively. 
This table provides regression results on the relation between management earnings forecast 
quality and learning effects and peer effects.  
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 10. The additional regression results of forecast quality 
  Additional Tests (First Performance Included) Additional Tests (Precision Included) Additional Tests (Both Included) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  PRECISION ERROR BIAS ERROR BIAS ERROR BIAS 
MF_YEARS 0.139*** -0.0661*** -0.0224** -0.0327*** -0.0189** -0.0650*** -0.0219** 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
PEER_PRECISION 0.00984 
      
 
(0.140) 
      PEER_ERROR 0.144** 0.149** 0.151**  
 
 
(0.066)  (0.060)  (0.066)  
PEER_BIAS  0.227***  0.234***  0.228*** 
  
 (0.067)  (0.065)  (0.067) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        Year Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        Observations 10,528 4,081 4,081 8,100 8,100 4,081 4,081 
R-squared 0.0846 0.352 0.367 0.288 0.281 0.358 0.368 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively. 
This table provides additional analysis on the relation between management earnings forecast quality and learning effects and peer effects. Columns 
1-3 include firm’s first forecast quality in the baseline model; columns 4-5 include firm’s forecast precision in the baseline model; Columns 6-7 
include both firm’s first forecast quality and firm’s forecast precision in the baseline model. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 11. Endogeneity Test 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
PRECISION ERROR BIAS 
MF_YEARS 0.0996*** -0.0333** -0.0159** 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.007) 
PEER_PRECISION 0.101 
  
 
(0.184) 
  
PEER_ERROR 
 
0.307** 
 
 
 
(0.151) 
 PEER_BIAS 
 
 
0.661** 
  
 
(0.322) 
cut1 -3.214*** 
   (0.684) 
cut2 -2.638***   
 (0.684)   
cut3 -0.6   
 (0.685)   
Constant  -1.824** -0.901** 
  (0.789) (0.439) 
    
Control Variables  YES YES YES 
First Stage       
PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK -1.085*** 4.027094*** 1.031542*** 
 
(0.154) (0.971) (0.160) 
PEER_MF_YEARS 0.0973*** -0.0064609 -0.002035 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002) 
Constant 1.165*** 2.440334 0.6141142 
  (0.017) (1.009) (0.164) 
Year Effect YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES 
    Observations 10,602 7,538 2,825 
R-squared 
 
0.092 0.252 
Log likelihood  -12745.626     
 Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively. 
This table provides results from endogeneity tests. The endogenous variable is peer firms’ 
forecast quality in the past one year (PEER__PRECISION, PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS). 
The instrument variable is the peer firms’ average idiosyncratic returns in the prior year 
(PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK) and peer firms’ average forecasting performance in the past one year 
(PEER_MF_YEARS).                                                          
See Appendix for variable definitions.          
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